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Kwasneski: Legal Interpretation of "Care Custodian"

COMMENT
THE DANGER OF A LABEL:
HOW THE LEGAL INTERPRETATION
OF "CARE CUSTODIAN" CAN
FRUSTRATE A TESTATOR'S WISH TO
MAKE A GIFT TO PERSONAL FRIEND
INTRODUCTION

Mr. Jones was a widower who recently passed away at age eightythree. I He was an only child with no children, and his closest living
relative was his cousin Richard, who lives in New York with his wife
and family. Richard rarely contacted or visited Mr. Jones, and he did not
even attend Mrs. Jones's funeral almost ten years ago. Mr. Jones slowed
down considerably in his last few years. He was diagnosed with adult
diabetes and could walk only with the support of a walker. He had to
give up his driver's license and so was unable to drive himself to the
doctor for appointments or to the drugstore to fill prescriptions.
Cathy grew up next door to Mr. and Mrs. Jones and had a close,
almost filial, relationship with them. After Mrs. Jones passed away,
Cathy frequently visited with Mr. Jones in an effort to raise his spirits.
As Mr. Jones slowed down with age, Cathy began helping him by doing
his grocery shopping, bringing him meals, driving him to doctor's
appointments and getting his prescriptions filled for him. Mr. Jones
eventually gave her his power of attorney, so that she could also help him

I Hypothetical derived from Conservatorship of Davidson, changing names, relationships
and circumstances. See Conservatorship of Davidson, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 702 (Ct. App. 2003).
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manage his finances. On his own initiative, Mr. Jones changed his will,
leaving half of his estate to Cathy. Prior to this change, Mr. Jones's
entire estate was to go to his cousin in New York.
When Mr. Jones passed away, Cathy was shocked and touched that
Mr. Jones remembered her so generously in his will. Unfortunately, Mr.
Jones's cousin may be able to invalidate this transfer, simply by raising
the sword of California Probate Code Section 21350. 2
Section 21350 provides a presumption of invalidity when an elder
or dependent adult makes a donative transfer to his or her care
custodian. 3 The definition of "care custodian" has varied among
California appellate courts, causing confusion within the legal profession
as to what the term encompasses. 4 The California Court of Appeal for
the First Appellate District ("First District") held that a personal friend
who provides caretaking services is excluded from the scope of the
statute. 5 Therefore, the transfer to Cathy would be valid in the First
District. 6 In contrast, the California Court of Appeal for the Second
Appellate District ("Second District") recently rejected this definition
and held that such friends are included in the term "care custodian.,,7 As
a result, Cathy would receive nothing in the Second District, regardless
of Mr. Jones's wishes. s
The California Supreme Court recently granted review of the issue
but has not yet reached a determination. 9 However, this Comment
asserts that despite how the court rules, the legislature should clarify the
definition of "care custodian" to avoid complicated judicial analyses. 10
A close review of the legislative history of the enactment and subsequent
amendment of Section 21350 reveals that the intent of the legislature was
to include only professional care custodians within the scope of its
presumption of invalidity.ll Amending the statute's definition of "care
custodian" would best clarify that only those in the business of providing
care to elders or dependent adults are to be included within its reach.12
Personal relationships that fall outside the scope of the statute would then
CAL. PROB. CODE § 21350 (Deering 2005).
CAL. PROB. CODE § 21350(a)(6) (Deering 2005).
4 See infra notes 85-134 and accompanying text.
5 See infra notes 87 -114 and accompanying text.
2

3

6

[d.

7

See infra notes 115-134 and accompanying text.
[d.

S

9 Bernard v. Foley, 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d 716 (Ct. App. 2005), rev. granted, No. Sl36070, 120
P.3d 1050 (Cal. Sep. 21, 2005).
10 See Bernard, 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d 724; see also infra notes 135-190 and accompanying text.
II See infra notes 141-165 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 191-195 and accompanying text.
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be governed by the traditional law of undue influence, which is better
suited to a consideration of such relationships. 13
Part I of this Comment examines the climate in which Section
21350 was enacted, including a summary of the law that traditionally
governed contests of testamentary transfers on the grounds of undue
influence prior to the statute's enactment. 14 Part II argues that the
statutory definition of "care custodian" should encompass only
professional care custodians. 15 Part III supplies the textual amendments
that should be made to provide sufficient clarification of the term's
meaning. 16 Part IV concludes that the statute's amendment would
continue to protect vulnerable elders or dependent adults from being
taken advantage of by those with whom they have a fiduciary
relationship, while simultaneously protecting their right to devise their
estates according to their wishes and allowing for the reward of those
who care for their ailing friends. 17
I.

SECTION 21350' S MODIFICATION OF THE TRADITIONAL LAW
GOVERNING UNDUE INFLUENCE

Before Section 21350 took effect in 1994/ 8 the long-standing rules
of undue influence governed when a testamentary transfer was contested
on the grounds of undue influence. 19 Section 21350 was enacted to make
donative transfers to drafters of testamentary instruments presumptively
invalid, shifting the burden of proving otherwise to the transferee. 2o The
statute was later modified to extend the presumption of invalidity to
Due to
transfers made to care custodians of dependent adults. 21
conflicting interpretations of "care custodian" by California appellate
courts,22 the current legal climate demands further amendment of the
statute to clarify that only transfers to professional care custodians are

See infra notes 166-190 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 18-134 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 135-190 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 191-195 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 196-205 and accompanying text.
18 See Eric Bailey and Davan Maharaj, Wilson Signs Bill to Protect Estates of the Elderly,
L.A. TIMES, Aug. 3, 1993, at B I; see also CAL. PROB. CODE § 21350 (Deering 2005).
19 See infra notes 24-39 and accompanying text.
20 See infra notes 40-57 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 58-66 and accompanying text.
22 Compare Conservatorship of Davidson, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 702,710-18 (Ct. App. 2003) with
Bernard v. Foley, 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d 716, 720-25 (Ct. App. 2005), rev. granted, No. SI36070, 120
P.3d 1050 (Cal. Sep. 21, 2005); see also infra notes 85-134 and accompanying text.
13
14
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subject to this presumption?3
A.

PRE-ST ATUTE LAW OF UNDUE INFLUENCE

Prior to the enactment of Section 21350, the law of undue influence
governed contests of testamentary transfers?4 The California Probate
Code declares ineffective any testamentary provision that is procured by
"duress, menace, fraud or undue influence.,,25 The burden of proving
that a donative transfer was procured through one of these prohibited
means lies with the contestant of the testamentary document. 26 The
proof presented by the contestant may be direct or circumstantial, but it
must be substantial to negate a deceased person's will.27 Due to the
common-law tradition of giving deference to the wishes of testators,
courts are reluctant to invalidate the will of a deceased person?8 The
provisions of a properly executed will are generally recognized as valid
without regard to how others may think the testator could have or should
have distributed his or her estate. 29
To prove undue influence in this context, a contestant must be able
to show not only that the proponent of the will used his or her influence
to secure its execution, but also that the influence exerted was equivalent
to "coercion destroying free agency on the part of the testator.,,30
Showing that the proponent had only a "mere opportunity to influence"
or "mere general influence" is not sufficient to meet the contestant's
burden of proof. 31 The contestant must prove the influence used was
such that it "overpower[ed] the volition of the testator and operate[d]
directly on the testamentary act.,m Therefore, a very high burden of
proof must be met for a court to hold a will invalid on the grounds of
undue influence. 33
However, when a contestant can prove three specific elements

See infra notes 135-190 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 25-39 and accompanying text.
25 CAL. PROB. CODE § 6104 (Deering 2005).
26 CAL. PROB. CODE § 8252 (Deering 2005).
27 Estate of Williams, 221 P.2d 714, 718 (Cal. Ct. App. 1950) (quoting Estate of Gleason,
130 P. 872, 876 (Cal. 1913)).
28 Estate of Fritschi, 384 P.2d 656, 659 (Cal. 1963) (quoting In re McDevitt, 30 P. 10 I, 106
(Cal. 1892).
23

24

29

Id.

30 Estate of Trefren, 194 P.2d 574,578 (Cal. Ct. App. 1948) (quoting Estate of Easton, 35
P.2d 614, 616-17 (Cal. Ct. App. 1934)).

Id.
Id.
33 Id.
31

32

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol36/iss2/7

4

Kwasneski: Legal Interpretation of "Care Custodian"

2006] LEGAL INTERPRETATION OF "CARE CUSTODIAN" 273
existed at the time of a will's execution, a rebuttable presumption of
undue influence arises. 34 The burden then shifts to the proponent of the
testamentary document to prove no undue influence was exerted to
procure its execution. 35 The three elements a contestant must prove are
that the testator had a confidential relationship with the proponent, the
proponent actively participated in either the will's preparation or
execution, and the terms of the will result in undue profit to the
proponent. 36 The standard of proof that must be met by the proponent in
rebutting the presumption of undue influence is a preponderance of
evidence,37 a relatively low standard, reflecting the long-standing
reluctance at common law to negate a Will.38 These rules of undue
influence governed all contests of testamentary transfers prior to the
enactment of Section 21350, and they continue to apply when a
transferee falls outside the scope of the statute. 39
B.

CALIFORNIA PROBATE CODE SECTION 21350

Section 21350 was enacted in 1993 (effective January 1, 1994),
following a scandal in Orange County, California, where estate-planning
attorney James D. Gunderson took advantage of his relationship with
elderly clients by writing himself into their testamentary documents as a
beneficiary or by giving himself discretionary power over distribution of
their assets. 40 The presumed invalidity of transfers made to drafters of
testamentary documents, created by the statute, was expanded in 1997
(effective January 1, 1998) to include other fiduciaries of dependent
adults, including care custodians. 41
1.

History and Enactment

Following a year-long investigation of attorney James D.
Gunderson, the Los Angeles Times published a report that revealed that
Gunderson had drafted thousands of testamentary documents in which he
was either left large bequests of money, was named executor or was
given the authority to choose to which organizations his client's money

34

Estate of Sarabia, 270 Cal. Rptr. 560, 563 (Ct. App. 1990).

35/d .
36/d .

37/d.

See Frirschi, 384 P.2d at 659.
See Conservatorship of Davidson, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 702, 720-22 (Ct. App. 2003).
40 See infra notes 42-57 and accompanying text.
41 See infra notes 58-66 and accompanying text.
38

39
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would gO.42 For example, one of his clients, Merrill A. Miller, changed
his trust at age ninety-eight, with Gunderson's assistance, to leave $3.5
million of his $18 million estate to Gunderson. 43 This bequest came to
Gunderson tax-free, because the document shifted the burden of paying
estate taxes to the other beneficiaries.44 Furthermore, a no-contest clause
was included in Miller's will and trust, so that any beneficiary who
contested the instrument would automatically lose his or her share of the
45
estate.
The expose of Gunderson received much attention and increased the
general concern that fiduciaries closely positioned to the elderly may
abuse their relationship.46 As a result, a movement began in the legal
community to statutorily shift the burden of proof from the contestant of
a testamentary instrument to the proponent by causing certain transferees
to be presumptively disqualified. 47 The Los Angeles Times report "was
the catalyst for Assemblyman [Tom] Umberg to introduce Assembly Bill
No. 21, December 7, 1992" for consideration by the California
legislature.48
The legislature responded to the heightened concern for the elderly
by enacting Section 21350. 49 The statute in its original form became law
on January 1, 1994. 50 It provided that a provision for a donative transfer
to the drafter or transcriber of an instrument, including a will or trust,
was presumptively invalid. 51 The scope of invalidity stretched to

42 Davan Maharaj, Leisure World Lawyer Heir to Clients' Millions, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 22,
1992, at AI.
43 [d.; Davan Maharaj, 4 Clients Whose Estates Enriched James D. Gunderson; Merrill A.
Miller, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1992, at A43; Davan Maharaj, Attorney Must Return Millions From
Estate, L.A. TIMES, July 16, 1994, at AI.
44 Davan Maharaj, 4 Clients Whose Estates Enriched James D. Gunderson; Merrill A. Miller,
L.A. TIMES, Nov. 22,1992, at A43.
45 [d. The use of no-contest clauses, such as the one used in the Miller trust, which make it
impossible for beneficiaries to contest the validity of a testamentary document without risk of losing
their own shares of the estate, was an issue of particular concern for the legislature. Brown v. Brown
(In re Estate of Bryant), 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 755, 762 (CI. App. 1996) (Work, Acting P.J., dissenting);
The Orange County Superior Court issued a judgment ordering Gunderson to return the $3.5 million
bequest, plus $500,000 interest, to the heirs of Merrill A. Miller. Davan Maharaj, Attorney Must
Return Millions From Estate, L.A. TIMES, July 16, 1994, at AI.
46 Brown, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 762 (Work, Acting P.J., dissenting).
47/d.
48

[d.

49

Eric Bailey and Davan Maharaj, Wilson Signs Bill to Protect Estates of the Elderly, L.A.

TIMES, Aug. 3, 1993, at B I.
50/d.
51 Legislative Counsel's Digest, Assemb. Bill No. 21 (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.), available at
http://www.leginfo.ca. gOY/pu b/93-94/bill/asmlab _000 1-0050/ab_21_ bi 11_930802_chaptered
(last
visited February 9,2006).
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encompass all those who were active in causing the instrument to be
drafted or transcribed, as well as any relative or business associate of the
drafter or transcriber. 52
In Graham v. Lenzi, the California Court of Appeal for the Fourth
Appellate District discussed the legislature's rationale in making such
transfers presumptively invalid. 53
The court determined that the
legislature was motivated by an awareness that an inherent danger
existed that those who are "uniquely positioned to procure gifts from
elderly persons through fraud, menace, duress or undue influence" may
take advantage of their position to the detriment of trustors and
54
Reflecting this observation made in Graham v. Lenzi, the
testators.
First District added in Bank of America v. Angel View Crippled
"to prevent
Children's Foundation that the section was passed
unscrupulous persons in fiduciary relationships from obtaining gifts from
elderly persons through undue influence or other overbearing
behavior.,,55
This shift in the burden of proof from the contestant of a donative
transfer to its proponent significantly changed the traditional law of
undue influence. 56 The change reflected the climate of concern regarding
the vulnerability of elderly people, in addition to concern that contestants
of testamentary transfers were heavily burdened by the high level of
proof required of them at common law to invalidate such transfers on the
57
ground of undue influence.

2.

1997 Amendment

In 1997 (effective January 1, 1998), the legislature expanded the
presumption of invalidity of Section 21350 to include donative transfers
made to a transferor's care custodian. 58 The amendment was sponsored
by the Estate Planning, Trust & Probate Law Section of the State Bar of
California. 59 In moving for an expansion of the presumption of
1d.
53 Graham v. Lenzi, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 407, 411 (Ct. App. 1995).
54 1d.
55 Bank of America v. Angel View Crippled Children's Found., 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 117, 120
(Ct. App. 1999).
56 See supra notes 24-39 and accompanying text.
57 See Bank of America, 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 121. Another significant result of the statutory
presumption of invalidity was that the initiation of a proceeding attacking the validity of a
testamentary document in such situations could no longer be hindered by an intimidating no-contest
clause. Brown, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 762 (Work, Acting P.I., dissenting).
58 CAL. PROB. CODE § 21350(a)(6) (Deering 2005).
59 See Conservatorship of Davidson, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 702, 713 (Ct. App. 2003); see also Sen.
52
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invalidity, the amendment's proponents wished to encompass "practical
nurses or other caregivers hired to provide in-home care," in addition to
the "lawyers or other fiduciaries" already included in the scope of the
statute. 60 Thus, the current form of Section 21350 was born. 61
Accordingly, the statute now mandates that a presumption of invalidity
shall be ascribed to testamentary transfers made by a dependent adult to
his or her care custodian. 62
The statutory definition of a "care custodian" is found in Section
15610.17 of the California Welfare and Institutions Code. 63 This section
defines a care custodian as
an administrator or an employee of any of the following public or
private facilities or agencies, or persons providing care or services for
elders or dependent adults, including members of the support staff and
maintenance staff. 64

Specific types of agencies, clinics, and facilities follow this definition,
which concludes with a final catchall provision incorporating "any other
protective, public, sectarian, mental health, or private assistance or
advocacy agency or person providing health services or social services
to elders or dependent adults.,,65 The portions of the "care custodian"
definition italicized above created ambiguity as to whether individuals
who care for friends are included, and those provisions have spurred
confusion and inconsistency of application of Section 21350 among
California appellate courtS. 66

Comm. on Judiciary, comm. on Assemb. Bill No. 1172 (1997-1998 Reg. Sess.) p. 4, available at
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/97-98Ibilllasmlab_11511200/ab_II72_cfa_19970723_15251O_sen_comm.html (last visited February 9, 2(06).
60 See Sen. Comm. on Judiciary, comm. on Assemb. Bill No. 1172 (1997-1998 Reg. Sess.) p.
4,
available
at
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/97-98Ibilllasmlab_11511200/ab_II723fa_19970723_15251O_sen_comm.html (last visited February 9, 2006); see also
Davidson, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 713.
61 CAL. PRos. CODE § 21350 (Deering 2005).
62 CAL. PROS. CODE § 21350(a)(6) (Deering 2005).
63 CAL. PRos. CODE § 21350(c) (Deering 2005).
64 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 156 1O.l7 (Deering 2005) (emphasis added); see also Bernard
v. Foley, 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d 716, 721-22 (Ct. App. 2005), rev. granted, No. S136070, 120 P.3d 1050
(Cal. Sep. 21, 2005) (analyzing the definition); see also Conservatorship of Davidson, 6 Cal. Rptr.
3d 702, 710-12 (Ct. App. 2003) (discussing the significance of the definition's text).
65 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 1561O.17(a)-(y) (Deering 2005); see also Bernard, 30 Cal.
Rptr. 3d at 721-22 (analyzing the provision); see also Davidson, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 710-13
(discussing the significance of the definition's text).
66 See infra notes 85-134 and accompanying text.
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3.

Exceptions to the Presumption of Invalidity

The legislature has recognized exceptions to the presumption of
invalidity created by Section 21350. 67 A transfer that satisfies any of the
exceptions enumerated in California Probate Code Section 21351 falls
outside the scope of presumed invalidity.68
First, the legislature excluded family members from the
presumption by providing an exception for those related to the transferor
by blood or marriage, including a cohabitant or registered domestic
partner of the transferor. 69 The term "related by blood or marriage"
encompasses those who are related to the transferor within five degrees
of kinship.7o This creates a wide sphere of exclusion, in that it extends to
a
transferor's
great-great-great-grandchildren,
great-great-greatgrandparents, great-grand uncles and aunts, great-grand nephews and
nieces, and first cousins once removed. 71 Section 21350, therefore,
applies only to transfers between unrelated or distantly related
individuals who are not cohabitants or registered domestic partners. 72
Second, a Certificate of Independent Review may be obtained at the
time a donative provision to a prohibited transferee is executed. 73 Should
a contest of the transfer subsequently arise, this document may be used to
rebut the presumption of invalidity otherwise imposed by Section
21350. 74 The Certificate of Independent Review is a written declaration
that must be made by an attorney independent from the person who
drafted the donative instrument, at the time a provision for a prohibited
transferee is executed. 75 The Certificate states that the attorney has
counseled the client (i.e., the transferor) for the purpose of determining
whether the purported transfer was the result of fraud, menace, duress, or
undue influence, and has come to the conclusion that it was not. 76 A
67

CAL. PROB. CODE § 21351 (Deering 2005).

68/d.
69
70

CAL. PROB. CODE § 21351(a) (Deering 2005).
CAL. PROB. CODE § 21351 (g) (Deering 2005).

71 JOELC. DOSRIS, STEWART E. STERK & MELANIE B. LESLIE, ESTATES AND TRUSTS CASES
AND MATERIALS 67 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., Foundation Press 2d ed. 2003) (1998) (providing
the Table of Consanguinity to illustrate the degrees of kinship within a family).
72 CAL. PROS. CODE § 21351 (a), (g) (Deering 2005).
73 CAL. PROB. CODE § 21351 (b) (Deering 2005).
74 Id .
75
Id .

76 Id. A point that may warrant re-evaluation by the legislature is the advantage of requiring
that an independent attorney execute a Certificate of Independent Review. Id. This was a logical
requirement when Section 21350 was in its original form, meaning the prohibited transferee was the
drafter of the testamentary document, because a conflict of interest existed. Legislative Counsel's
Digest, Assemb. Bill No. 21 (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.). available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/93-
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drafting attorney who knows that a client's intended beneficiary is within
the group presumptively disqualified by Section 21350 has a duty to
advise that the client obtain a Certificate of Independent Review. 77
Third, a court order may be obtained validating a donative transfer
if its proponent presents clear and convincing evidence that the transfer
was not the product of fraud, menace, duress or undue influence. 78 The
rules governing the pursuit of such a court order are quite stringent. 79
The evidence used may not be based solely on the testimony of any
person listed in Section 21350(a) of the California Probate Code,so
namely: the drafter of the instrument; any partner, shareholder or
employee of a law partnership or corporation the drafter has an interest
in; fiduciaries of the transferor; and a care custodian of a transferor who
is a dependent adult. S!
Included within the scope of "drafter,"
"fiduciary" and "care custodian" are any of such person's employees or
relations by blood or marriage (including a cohabitant or registered
domestic partner).S2 The required clear-and-convincing standard of proof
is much higher than the "preponderance of evidence" necessary to rebut
a presumption of invalidity at common law. s3 This is consistent with the
legislative intent that a rebuttal of a Section 21350 presumption of
invalidity be much more difficult for persons who fall within its scope. S4
94/biIIJasmJab_0001-0050/ab_21_biIC930802_chaptered (last visited February 9,2006). But when
the designated transferee is the client's care custodian, is the drafter not in the same position as an
independent attorney, if not a better position, to make a judgment as to the circumstances of the
transfer, similar to a capacity judgment? See generally Matthew Bender & Co., Inc., I CALIFORNIA
WILLS & TRUSTS § 11.03 (2005) (discussing testamentary capacity). If a client and the estateplanning attorney have a continuous relationship pursuant to which the client has returned seeking an
amendment of his or her testamentary documents, that attorney may in fact be in a much better
position than outside counsel to determine whether a purported transfer is the result of undue
influence.
77 Osnorio v. Weingarten, 21 Cal. Rptr. 3d 246,266-67 (Ct. App. 2004). However, a testator
may create a holographic will without seeking the counsel of an attorney. See generally Matthew
Bender & Co., Inc., I CALIFORNIA WILLS & TRUSTS § 11.08 (2005). Such a testator may be
unaware of Section 21350's presumption of invalidity, and a transfer to a disqualified recipient could
be invalidated if contested. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 21350 (Deering 2005); see also Estate of
McDowell, 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 10,24 (Ct. App. 2004).
78 CAL. PROB. CODE § 21351(e) (Deering 2005). This option is unavailable, however, if the
transferee is the drafter of the testamentary instrument. CAL. PROB. CODE § 21351(e)(I) (Deering
2005).
79 See infra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
80 CAL. PROB. CODE § 21351(d) (Deering 2(05).
81 CAL. PROB. CODE § 21350(a) (Deering 2(05).
82 See CAL. PROB. CODE § 21350(a)(2), (5), (7) (Deering 2005).
83 See Estate of Sarabia, 270 Cal. Rptr. 560, 563 (Ct. App. 1990).
84 See Bank of America v. Angel View Crippled Children's Found., 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 117,
121 (Ct. App. 1999). In addition, the presumption does not apply to bequests under $3,000 (but only
if the transferor's total estate is in excess of the amount provided by California Probate Code Section
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C.

CONFLICTING INTERPRETATIONS OF "CARE CUSTODIAN" IN
CALIFORNIA ApPELLATE COURTS

The California appellate courts' conflicting interpretations of the
definition of "care custodian" under Section 21350 has resulted in
confusion among the legal community regarding the scope of its
meaning. 85 The principal component of the definition at issue is whether
the term is meant to encompass both those who care for dependent adults
out of a personal relationship and those who professionally provide such
care and are hired for that purpose. 86
1.

Conservatorship of Davidson and the First Appellate District of
California

The First District held that a care custodian whose relationship with
a dependent adult has grown from purely professional roots is the type of
relationship addressed by Section 21350. 87 In Conservatorship of
Davidson, a personal friendship with a dependent adult evolved into one
of caretaking. 88 The question presented was whether such a friend was to
be included in the presumption of invalidity created by Section 21350. 89
In holding that the statute was not meant to encompass personal
relationships, the court reasoned it would be bad public policy to
"punish" those who care for the elderly for charitable and personal
reasons. 90
In Davidson, decedent Dolores Davidson was the close friend of
Stephen Gungl for almost forty years. 91 Mrs. Davidson and her husband,
when he was alive, had frequently socialized with Gungl and his life
partner Howard Holtz over the years, spending numerous celebratory
occasions and holidays together. 92 As Davidson ailed and declined with
age, Gungl and Holtz provided her with increasing amounts of
assistance, which included cooking, shopping, and driving her to perform

13100) or to instruments executed by nonresidents of California, unless the instrument was signed in
California or the transferor was a California resident at the time of execution. See CAL. PRos. CODE
§ 21351 (h), (i) (Deering 2005).
85 See infra notes 87-134 and accompanying text.
86

[d.

Conservatorship of Davidson, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 702, 715-16 (Ct. App. 2003).
88 [d. at 705-10.
89 [d. at 704-05.
90 [d. at 713.
91 [d. at 705.
87

92

[d.
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errands or to get to appointments, such as those with her doctor. 93
Davidson eventually gave Gungl her power of attorney so that Gungl
could also maintain her finances. 94
Davidson ultimately revoked her original will, which had provided
for the bulk of her estate to go to her cousin Elaine Morken and her
cousin's husband Cal Morken, her closest living relatives. 95 Her original
will also provided for several specific bequests to other individuals,
including a $1,000 gift to Gung1. 96 In the new testamentary documents
Davidson executed, she left the bulk of her estate to Gung!, with only a
nominal $5,000 bequest to the Morkens. 97 Following Davidson's death,
Cal Morken contested the gift to Gungl,98 claiming it was invalid due to
the care custodial nature of Gungl' s relationship with Davidson. 99
The court disagreed with Morken's contention that Section 21350
was meant to encompass caretaking provided in connection with a
personal relationship.loo Instead, the court interpreted the enumeration of
public agencies and private professional organizations and individuals
listed in Section 15610.17 of the California Welfare and Institutions
Code as implying only the occupational provision of caretaking services
was to be affected by the statute. 101 Thus, the court held that only those
who provide care as part of "the professional or occupational provision
of health or social services" are to be included within the scope of the
statute. 102
In addition, the court created a test to determine whether a
caregiving relationship is primarily personal or professional. 103
According to this test, the key issue in analyzing a care custodian
relationship is determining whether the provision of health and social
services or the personal relationship existed first. 104 The court provided
three factors that must be weighed to make this determination: "(1) the
length of time the individuals had a personal relationship before
assuming the roles of caregiver and recipient; (2) the closeness and
93

Davidson, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 705.

94

[d. at 706.

95 [d. at 705-07. Davidson was an only child. /d. at 705. Her husband passed away in the
late 1970's, and they had no children. [d.
96 [d. at 705.
97 Davidson, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 707.
98 [d. at 709-10. Elaine Morken passed away on January 15,2000. ld at 705.
99 ld. at 709- 10.
100 ld. at 704-05.
101 [d. at 711-12; see CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 15610.17 (Deering 2005).
102 Davidson, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 715 (emphasis added).
103 [d. at 716.
104 [d.
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authenticity of the personal relationship; and (3) whether any money was
paid for the provision of care.,,105
The court determined that an analysis of these factors showed that
the relationship between Gungl and Davidson was personal and excluded
from the reach of Section 21350.106 It reasoned that the two had been
friends for almost forty years, and the genuine nature of their friendship
was clear.107 Any money paid to Gungl was reimbursement for expenses
related to care that he had expended, not compensation for his
services. 108
Because Section 21350 was not triggered, the court then examined
whether Cal Morken, as the contesting beneficiary, had met the burden
of proving that the transfer was the result of duress, menace, fraud or
undue influence, pursuant to the traditional rules of undue influence. 109
The court found that he had not made a showing that the three necessary
elements creating a presumption of undue influence existed. I 10 Although
Gungl and Davidson had a relationship that qualified as confidential,
Morken had shown neither active participation in the execution of the
testamentary documents nor undue profit. III Contacting the drafter of
Davidson's trust and being present at the initial meeting did not
constitute active participation in its execution on Gung}' s part. ll2
Additionally, after considering the duration of Gungl and Davidson's
friendship and the tremendous amount of care Gungl had provided to her,
in contrast with the little interest the Morkens had taken in Davidson, no
undue profit to Gungl was shown. 113 Therefore, the court held that
Gungl had not unduly influenced Davidson, and the testamentary
provisions Davidson had made for his benefit were affirmed as valid. 114
2. Bernard v. Foley and the Second Appellate District of California
In contrast, the Second District declined to apply the test created by
the Davidson court to determine whether a caretaking relationship had
derived from a primarily personal or professional relationship.115 In
105

ld.

ld. at 716-18.
107 ld. at7l7-18.
l06

Davidson, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 716-17.
ld. at 720-22; see also supra notes 24-39 and accompanying text.
110 Davidson, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 720-22; see supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
III Davidson, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 721-22.
112ld at 721.
108

109

113

/d. at 721-22.
at 722.

114/d.
115

Bernard v. Foley, 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d 716, 723-24 (Ct. App. 2005), rev. granted, No.
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Bernard v. Foley, after a consideration of legislative intent and a strict
reading of Sections 21350 and 21351, the court broadly defined "care
custodian" to include all those who provide health services to the elderly
or dependent adults, regardless of the personal or professional nature of
their relationship, by focusing on the provision of health services. I 16
The Bernard court partially based its holding on the portion of
Section 15610.17 of the California Welfare & Institutions Code that
includes a catchall definition of care custodian as "persons providing
care or services for elders or dependent adults.,,117 The court concluded
that a strict reading of Section 21350, and the fact that specific
exemptions are made to the rule in Section 21351, implies the exclusion
of any other exception. l1S The court determined that "[h]ad the
Legislature wished to exempt preexisting friends from the definition of
care custodian, it would have done so," and it was not the role of the
courts to "usurp the legislative function" and expand the law in such a
way. 119
In Bernard, the decedent, Carmel L. Bosco, was also a widow with
no children. 12o During the last two months of her life, Bosco lived with
her nephew's ex-wife, Ann Erman, and Erman's boyfriend, James
Foley.121 Three days before Bosco passed away, she amended her trust
to designate Erman and Foley as equal beneficiaries of the trust
residue. 122 Prior to that time, no provision had been made for either
Erman or Foley in the trust. 123 The beneficiaries whose interests in
Bosco's estate were reduced or eliminated as a result of the amendment
contested its validity. 124
In reaching its decision, the court emphasized the significance of
including the term "practical nurse" in the Senate Commentary on the
Assembly Bill for the enactment of Section 21350(a)(6) of the California
Probate Code. 125 The record showed that Erman and Foley assisted

S136070, 120 P.3d 1050 (Cal. Sep. 21, 2005).
116 [d. at 722-24.
117 [d. at 722; CAL. WELF. & lNST. CODE § 156IO.l7(y) (Deering 2005).
lIS Bernard, 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 724.
119
1d.
120 [d. at718.
121 [d.
122
1d.

Bernard, 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 718.
ld at 718-19.
125 [d. at 720 (quoting Conservatorship of Davidson, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 702, 713 (Ct. App.
2003»; Sen. Comm. on Judiciary, comm. on Assemb. Bill No. 1172 (1997-1998 Reg. Sess.) p. 4,
available
at
hnp:/Iwww.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/97-98/billJasmJab_115112oo/ab_1172_cfa_19970723_15251O_sen30mm.html (last visited February 9, 2006).
123

124
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Bosco with numerous tasks, including meal preparation, cleaning and
helping her with daily personal hygiene maintenance. 126 Erman also
administered oral medications and topical medicines to wounds on the
decedent's legs. 127 The court held that the provision of such "health
services" elevated the level of caretaking to that of a professional
practical nurse. 128 Therefore, Erman and Foley fell within Section
21350' s presumption of undue influence. 129 Since they did not present
clear and convincing evidence to rebut that presumption, the
testamentary provision made for their benefit was held invalid. 130
The Bernard court also distinguished Davidson, in which the
assistance provided by the beneficiary basically consisted of cooking,
shopping, driving and providing financial services, and did not constitute
"health services" of a medical nature. l3l But the definition of "care
custodian" provided by Section 15610.17 of the California Welfare &
Institutions Code includes in pertinent part the provision of "health
services or social services.,,132 In focusing its decision on the health
services Erman provided to Bosco, the Bernard court did not specifically
address whether services similar to those in Davidson would fall within
the scope of "social services," likewise making Section 21350
applicable. 133
However, its vehement rejection of Davidson's
preexisting-personal-relationship exception strongly suggests that the
Bernard court would have held someone like Gungl to be a care
custodian within the scope of Section 21350. 134
II.

THE NEED TO AMEND THE DEFINITION OF "CARE CUSTODIAN" TO
INCLUDE ONLY PROFESSIONALS

Currently, there is no clear standard that may be relied upon
regarding the correct definition of "care custodian.,,135 Conflicting
interpretations by California appellate courts reveal this ambiguity.136 A

126

127

Bernard. 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 722.
1d.

128/d.
129/d.
130

at 725-26.

1d.

131 /d.

at 724-25.

CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 15610.17(y) (Deering 2005) (emphasis added).
133 Bernard. 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 720-26.
134/d. at 723-24. The California Supreme Court has granted review of the decision reached in
Bernard, but has not yet reached a determination. Bernard v. Foley, 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d 716 (Cl. App.
2005), rev. granted. No. S136070, 120 P.3d 1050 (Cal. Sep. 21, 2005).
135 See supra notes 85-134 and accompanying text.
136
1d.
132
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close scrutiny of the statute and the legislative intent behind its
enactment support the First District's conclusion and its interpretation
that only transfers to professional caregivers are regulated by this
section. 137 To resolve the uncertainty, the text of the statutory definition
of "care custodian" should be amended to include only professional
caregivers and their employees. 138 Personal friends who become
caregivers of the elderly or dependent adults should be excluded from the
scope of the definition because (1) it was the legislature's original intent
to include only professional caregivers,139 and (2) the traditional law of
undue influence is better suited to govern personal caregiving
relationships that fall outside the intended scope of the statute. 140
A.

THE LEGISLATURE DID NOT INTEND TO INCLUDE PERSONAL
FRIENDS WITHIN THE SCOPE OF "CARE CUSTODIAN."

A close reading of both the proposal for legislation 141 and analysis
regarding the Assembly Bill for the enactment of section 21350(a)(6) of
the California Probate Code 142 suggests an intent to include only
professional caregivers, and not personal caregivers, in the statutory
definition of "care custodian.,,143 A key element of the analysis is the
inclusion of the term "practical nurse" in legislative documents. l44 The
court in Bernard suggested that the term "practical nurse" may refer to
an unlicensed individual who administers medicines and provides health
services. 145 However, the general meaning of the term, as well as the
context in which it is used in both the proposal and analysis, indicates it
137 See Conservatorship of Davidson, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 702, 710-16 (Ct. App. 2003); see also
infra notes 141-165 and accompanying text.
138 See infra notes 191-195 and accompanying text.
139 See infra notes 141-165 and accompanying text.
140 See infra notes 166-190 and accompanying text.
141 See Davidson, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 713; see also Cal. State Bar Estate Planning, Trust &
Prob. Law Section, Legislative Proposal, Assemb. Bill No. 1172, excerpted from Senate Comm. on
Judiciary legislative bill file.
142 See Davidson, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 7\3; see also Sen. Comm. on Judiciary, comm. on
Assemb. Bill No. 1172 (1997-1998 Reg. Sess.) p. 4, available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/9798IbiIVasmlab_1151-1200/ab_II723fa_19970723_15251O_sen30mm.htrnl (last visited February
9,2006).
143 Davidson, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 712-13.
144 [d.; see also Bernard, 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 720 (quoting Davidson, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 713);
see also Cal. State Bar Estate Planning, Trust & Prob. Law Section, Legislative Proposal, Assemb.
Bill No. 1172, excerpted from Senate Comm. on judiciary legislative bill file; see also Sen. Comm.
on JUdiciary, comm. on Assemb. Bill No. 1172 (1997-1998 Reg. Sess.) p. 4, available at
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/97 -98Ibill/asmlab_11511200:ab_II72_cfa_19970723_15251O_sen30mm.html (last visited February 9,2006).
145 Bernard, 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 722-25.
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was used to convey a professional relationship.146
The proponents of adding care custodians to Section 21350's list of
presumptively disqualified transferees emphasized the term "practical
nurse" in articulating the purpose and application of the proposed
amendment. 147 Concern was expressed that the elderly or other
dependent adults may be taken advantage of by those in the "industry"
who were determined to be "practical nurses.,,148 The amendment's
proponents felt that including care custodians within Section 21350's
presumption of invalidity would "prevent the growing 'cottage industry'
of 'practical nurses' from successfully taking advantage of dementing
elders" by eliminating the incentive to do SO.149 Use of the word
"industry" has a business connotation that indicates an intent by the
proponents of the Bill for the amendment to apply to those who are in the
business of being practical nurses, as opposed to those who provide
medical care in the course of personal caregiving.150
Furthermore, the general meaning ascribed to the term "practical
nurse" has a professional connotation. 151 Two dictionaries provide the
definition of a "practical nurse" as either (1) a "licensed practical nurse"
or (2) a "person who has had practical experience in nursing care but
who is not a graduate of a degree program in nursing.,,152 Although the
second part of this definition could be read to allow for the inclusion of
individuals such as Ann Erman in Bernard, who administered oral
medications and topical medicines to wounds on the decedent Carmel L.
Bosco's legs,153 another dictionary resolves this uncertainty by defining a
"practical nurse" as "a nurse who cares for the sick professionally

See infra notes 147·165; see also Davidson, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 713.
Davidson. 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 713; see also Cal. State Bar Estate Planning, Trust & Prob.
Law Section, Legislative Proposal, Assemb. Bill No. 1172. excerpted from Senate Comm. on
Judiciary legislative bill file.
148 Davidson, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 713; see also Cal. State Bar Estate Planning, Trust & Prob.
Law Section, Legislative Proposal, Assemb. Bill No. 1172, excerpted from Senate Comm. on
Judiciary legislative bill file.
149 Davidson, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 713 (quoting Cal. State Bar Estate Planning, Trust & Prob.
Law Section, Legislative Proposal, Assemb. Bill No. 1172, excerpted from Senate Comm. on
Judiciary legislative bill file) (emphasis added).
150 See Davidson, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 713.
151 See infra notes 152·155 and accompanying text.
152 "Practical Nurse," THE AMERICAN HERITAGE® DICfIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(Joseph P. Pickett et aI., eds., Houghton Mifflin Co. 4th ed. 2000), available at
http://www.dictionary.com/search?q=practical%20nurse (last visited February 9. 2006); "Practical
Nurse." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE® STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICfIONARY (Houghton Mifflin Co. 2d
ed. 2002). available at http://www.dictionary.com/search?q=practical%20nurse (last visited
February 9, 2006).
153 Bernard, 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 722.
146

147
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without having the training or experience required of a registered
nurse.,,154 An additional source classifies a practical nurse as "a nurse
who has enough training to be licensed by a state to provide routine care
for the sick.,,155 When these definitions provided by various general
dictionaries are taken as a whole, it appears that the generally accepted
definition of a "practical nurse" is one who provides nursing services
professionally. 156
Additionally, programs for the acqulSltlOn of practical nursing
degrees are offered by a variety of educational institutions. 157 The
Bureau of Labor Statistics in the U.S. Department of Labor, in a report
issued on the occupational outlook of licensed practical nurses, describes
a licensed practical nurse ("LPN") as one who "care[s] for the sick,
injured, convalescent, and disabled under the direction of physicians and
registered nurses.,,158 Such nurses provide basic care such as monitoring
their patients, administering medications and aiding with personal
activities. 159 It is noteworthy that in the report, the term "practical nurse"
is used interchangeably with "licensed practical nurse," or "LPN,"
indicating that a reference to a "practical nurse" has the same
professional connotation. 160
In the analysis prepared for the Senate Judiciary Committee
regarding the Assembly Bill for the enactment of Section 21350(a)(6) of
the California Probate Code, the proponents of the bill expressed a desire
to extend the scope of the statute by making donative transfers to

154 "Practical Nurse," MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S MEDICAL DESK DICTIONARY (MerriamWebster,
Inc.
Revised
ed.
2002),
available
at
http://www.dictionary.comlsearch?q=practical%20nurse (last visited February 9, 2006) (emphasis
added).
155 "Practical
Nurse," WORDNET@ 2.0 (Princeton University 2003), available at
http://www.dictionary.comlsearch?q=practical%20nurse (last visited February 9, 2006) (emphasis
added).
156 See supra notes 152-155 and accompanying text.
157 See
Degree-Site.com, Index of Schools for Practical Nursing, available at
http://www.degree-site.comlmedicaLhealthcareipractical_nursing.html(last visited February 9,
2006).
158 Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Outlook Handbook,
2004-05 Edition, Licensed Practical and Licensed Vocational Nurses, available at
http://www.bls.gov/oco/ocos102.htm (last visited February 9,2006); see also Bernard, 30 Cal. Rptr.
3d at 722.
159 Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Outlook Handbook,
2004-05 Edition, Licensed Practical and Licensed Vocational Nurses, available at
http://www.bls.gov/oco/ocos102.htm (last visited February 9,2006); see also Bernard, 30 Cal. Rptr.
3d at 722.
160 See Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Outlook
Handbook, 2004-05 Edition, Licensed Practical and Licensed Vocational Nurses, available at
http://www.bls.gov/oco/ocosl02.htm (last visited February 9, 2006).
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"practical nurses or other caregivers hired to provide in-home care"
presumptively invalid. 161 Taken in context, the phrase strongly suggests
usage of the term "practical nurse" in a professional sense. 162 The text in
the analysis specifically states "practical nurses or other caregivers hired
to provide in-home care.'.163 The use of the words "or other" indicates
that practical nurses are considered hired caregivers. l64 This reveals
legislative intent that those hired and paid to provide care to the elderly
or dependent adults be included in the scope of the presumption of
invalidity. 165
B.

THE TRADITIONAL LAW OF UNDUE INFLUENCE IS BETTER SUITED
TO GOVERN TRANSFERS MADE IN THE CONTEXT OF PERSONAL
CAREGIVER RELATIONSHIPS.

If the circumstances surrounding a donative transfer left to a friend
are suspect, the traditional law of undue influence provides sufficient
recourse to a contestant. 166 These long-standing laws are much better
suited to govern a personal caregiver relationship than the automatic
presumption of invalidity created by Section 21350. 167 They provide for
simultaneous protection of both the right of the decedent to devise his or
her estate as he or she sees fit and the rights of a natural beneficiary.168
Testamentary provisions procured by duress, menace, fraud or
undue influence are ineffective. 169 A contestant has the burden of
proving undue influence l70 but may shift the burden of proof to the
proponent of the testamentary provision if the contestant is able to show
(1) a confidential relationship between the transferor and beneficiary, (2)
active participation on the part of the beneficiary in the execution of the
161 Conservatorship of Davidson, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 702, 713 (Ct. App. 2003); Sen. Comm. on
Judiciary, comm. on Assemb. Bill No. 1172 (1997-1998 Reg. Sess.) p. 4, available at
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/97-98/billJasm/ab_IISI1200/ab_II72_cfa_19970723_IS2SIO_sen_comm.html (last visited February 9,2006).
162 See Davidson, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 712- 13.
163 Sen. Comm. on JUdiciary, comm. on Assemb. Bill No. 1172 (1997-1998 Reg. Sess.) p. 4,
available
at
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/97-98/billJasm/ab_IISI1200/ab_II72_cfa_19970723_IS2SIO_sen_comm.html (last visited February 9, 2006) (emphasis
added); see Davidson, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 713.
164 See Davidson, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 713.
165 1d. at 712-13.
166 See Davidson, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 720-22; see also supra notes 24-39 and accompanying
text.
167 See Davidson, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 720-22.

168

/

d.

CAL. PROS. CODE § 6104 (Deering 200S).
170 CAL. PROS. CODE § 82S2 (Deering 200S).
169
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testamentary document, and (3) undue profit to the beneficiary.17I
A personal relationship in which a friend provides some care of
either a financial or medical nature to a dependent adult is included in the
scope of a "confidential relationship.,,172 In Estate of Chesney, neighbors
began to assist the decedent when she became incapacitated as a result of
two strokes and a sprained ankle, and they later entered into an
agreement with the decedent that they would care for her for the rest of
her life in return for the deed to her house. 173 The court held that these
neighbors had a confidential relationship with the decedent. 174 In Estate
of Wright, a neighboring long-time friend was considered to have had a
confidential relationship with the decedent because she provided services
such as shopping, driving, administration of shots and payment of bills,
and was a joint tenant in the decedent's house and bank account. 175
Similarly, after determining that Section 21350 did not apply, the court
in Davidson held that by virtue of the nature of the assistance Gungl
provided to Davidson, their friendship amounted to a confidential
relationship. 176 Thus, concerns regarding vulnerability that may result
from such a relationship are already met. 177
However, under the traditional rules, the burden to disprove undue
influence will not shift to such a friend unless the other two elements are
also met: (1) the friend played an active role in the execution of a
testamentary document from which he or she would benefit, and (2) the
friend unduly profited from the transfer. 178 As discussed above, the court
in Davidson found that these elements had not been met; therefore, the
contesting beneficiary had not met his burden of proof and the trust was
valid.179 The court in Estate of Wright also concluded that the remaining
two elements had not been shown to exist and held the contested
instrument to be valid. 180
By contrast, in Estate of Chesney, the court found that the neighbors
played an active role in the procurement of the contested will because
Mrs. Bosworth not only was present at the signing of the will but had
171 See Estate of Sarabia, 270 Cal. Rptr. 560, 563 (Ct. App. 1990); see also supra notes 34-38
and accompanying text.
172 See, e.g., Estate of Chesney, 228 P.2d 46, 47-48 (Cal. Ct. App. 1951); see also, e.g., Estate
of Wright, 33 Cal. Rptr. 5, 9 (Ct. App. 1963).
173 Chesney, 228 P.2d at 47-48.
174 [d. at 48.
175 Wright, 33 Cal. Rptr. at 6-8.
176 Conservatorship of Davidson, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 702, 721 (Ct. App. 2003).
177 See Davidson, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 720-22.
178 [d.; see Estate of Sarabia, 270 Cal. Rptr. 560, 563 (Ct. App. 1990).
179 Davidson, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 722; see supra notes 109-114 and accompanying text.
180 Wright, 33 Cal. Rptr. at 8-10.
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dictated the terms to an attorney who never consulted personally with the
decedent. 181 The court additionally found that the neighbors had unduly
profited to the exclusion of the decedent's relatives, satisfying the third
element. 182 The satisfaction of all three elements resulted in a finding of
undue influence that invalidated the will in question. 183
These examples demonstrate that the traditional law of undue
influence protects personal friends to whom a decedent may wish to
make a testamentary gift, while also providing protection to the decedent
and other beneficiaries in the case of a suspect personal relationship.184
It is logical to presume that no undue influence was involved when a
friend exercised no power over how a testator chose to devise his or her
property. This is a reasonable conclusion because the actions of the
friend were completely independent from the drafting of any
testamentary document. Likewise, if evidence is presented that a
genuine friendship existed between a proponent of a will and an elder or
dependent adult to whom the proponent provided attentive care, it is
reasonable to conclude that a transfer to such a friend did not constitute
undue profit, especially if someone who would appear to be a more
natural object of the elder's bounty and affection took no interest in the
elder. 185
Furthermore, as noted in Estate of Fritschi, "the right to dispose of
one's property by will is most solemnly assured by law, and ... does not
depend upon its judicious use.,,186 In Davidson, the court expressed
concern that the imposition of "burdensome technical and procedural
barriers on the ability of elderly individuals to recognize and reward
services performed for them in their declining years by close personal
friends, intimates and companions" would be the result of an inclusion of
such individuals within the scope of Section 21350. 187 The court
reasoned that this would essentially serve as punishment to those who
had committed "self-sacrificing acts of care and companionship," as well
as a limit on the fundamental right to testamentary disposition. 188
Because the traditional law of undue influence provides a scheme

Chesney, 228 P.2d at 48.
1d. at 47-49.
183 /d. at 47 and 49.
184 See Davidson, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 720-22.
185 See Estate of Williams, 221 P.2d 714, 719-20 (Cal. Ct. App. 1950); see also Wright, 33
Cal. Rptr. at 9-10; see also Davidson, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 721-22.
186 Estate of Fritschi, 384 P.2d 656,659 (Cal. 1963) (quoting In re McDevitt, 30 P. 101, 106
(Cal. 1892)).
187 Davidson, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 713.
188 [d.; see also Fritschi, 384 P.2d at 659.
181

182
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that better suits the situation in which a contestant questions a transfer
resulting from a personal caregiver relationship, such personal friends
should not be included within the automatic presumption of Section
21350. 189 This approach prevents encroachment upon the hallowed right
hWIS
· h . 190
. th·
o f testators to deVlse
elr estates as t ey
III. PROPOSED AMENDMENT OF THE STATUTORY DEFINITION OF "CARE
CUSTODIAN"

Section 21350 uses the definition of "care custodian" provided by
Section 15610.17 of the California Welfare and Institutions Code. 191
Section 15610.17 currently begins by stating:
"Care custodian" means an administrator or an employee of any of the
following public or private facilities or agencies, or persons providing
care or services for elders or dependent adults, including members of
the support staff and maintenance staff. 192

Ambiguity as to the scope of this definition would be resolved by
shifting part of the text and adding the words "hired to provide," to read
as follows:
"Care custodian" means an administrator or an employee of any of the
following public or private facilities or agencies, including members
of the support staff and maintenance staff, or other persons hired to
provide care or services for elders or dependent adults.

This change would clarify that the definition encompasses only those
individuals who are in the occupation of providing caretaking services.
Following the enumeration of various public and private facilities
and agencies,193 the catchall provision at the end of the code section
should likewise be modified to resolve ambiguity. It currently includes
within the definition of "care custodian":
Any other protective, public, sectarian, mental health or private
assistance or advocacy agency or person providing health services or

See Davidson, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 714-15 and 720-22.
[d.; see also Fritschi, 384 P.2d at 659.
191 CAL. PROB. CODE § 21350(c) (Deering 2005).
192 CAL. WELF. & lNST. CODE § 15610.17 (Deering 2005).
193 CAL. WELF. & lNST. CODE § 15610. 17(a)-(x) (Deering 2005).
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social services to elders or dependent adults. 194

However, the addition of the words "who is hired" would limit the scope
of the definition to exclude a personal friend who provides care to an
elder or dependent adult. Subpart (y) of Section 15610.17 should
therefore read as follows:
Any other protective, public, sectarian, mental health or private
assistance or advocacy agency or person who is hired to provide
health services or social services to an elder or dependent adult.

These two changes to the text of Section 15610.17 of the California
Welfare and Institutions Code would provide for consistency in
application among California courts by clarifying that only professional
individuals, hired for the purpose of providing care to an elder or
dependent adult, are to be included within the scope of the "care
custodian" definition. 195
IV. CONCLUSION
In expanding Section 21350's presumption of invalidity to include
"care custodians," the legislature has created an ambiguity as to whom
the term encompasses. 196 This ambiguity has manifested itself in the
The First
conflicting decisions of California appellate courts. 197
District's holding that only professional care custodians are included
within the statute's scope is in direct contrast with the Second District's
view that personal friends who provide care are also included. 198 The
California Supreme Court has granted a petition for review of the
decision reached by the Second District in Bernard v. Foley, but it has
not yet reached a deterrnination. 199 However, a statutory amendment
would best clarify the statute and achieve consistency in application by
California courts. 200 The text of Section 15610.17 of the California
Welfare and Institutions Code, which provides the definition of "care
custodian" for purposes of Section 21350, should be amended to include
CAL. WELF. & lNST. CODE § 15610.17(y) (Deering 2005).
See Davidson, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 714-16.
196 See supra notes 58-66 and accompanying text.
197 See supra notes 85-134 and accompanying text.
198 ld.
194

195

199 Bernard Y. Foley, 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d 716 (Ct. App. 2005), rev. granted, No. S136070, 120
P.3d 1050 (Cal. Sep. 21, 2005).
200 See supra notes 135-165 and accompanying text; see also Bernard, 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d at
724.
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only professional care custodians. 201 A study of the legislative history
leading up to the enactment of Section 21350 supports a finding that only
professional caregivers were meant to be included. 202 Furthermore, the
traditional law of undue influence is better suited to govern contests that
pertain to testamentary transfers to personal friends, who should fall
outside the scope of Section 21350's presumption of invalidity.203
Modification of the wording of the definition of "care custodian" would
clarify that only a professional care custodian falls within its scope,z04
This would protect the testamentary right to disposition and allow for
reward of the charitable provision of care given by well-meaning friends
to ailing elders during their declining years, without sacrificing the
protection of such vulnerable dependent adults. 2os
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201

See supra notes 191-195 and accompanying text; see also Davidson, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d at

714-16.

See supra notes 141-165 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 166-190 and accompanying text.
204 See supra notes 191-195 and accompanying text.
205 See Fritschi, 384 P.2d at 659; see also Davidson, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 713.
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